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Gender Politics in the Dominican







University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
A considerable body of research has analyzed the influence of the women’s movement, changes
in women’s political representation, and policies promoting women’s interests in the developing
world. However, we know comparatively less about the degree to which the attitudes and
behaviors of the mass public mirror these national patterns. This article explores the
evolution of gender differences in citizens’ political interest, civic engagement, and support
for women in politics in the Dominican Republic over 1994–2004, a period important for
the country’s democratization as well as one of significant changes in gender-related
discourse and policies. We find evidence of a shift from a traditional gender gap to a modern
gender gap, but the explanations for changes in women’s views are distinct from those of
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men. We find that sociostructural factors, particularly age and education, and cues from
political elites have significantly different effects on men versus women. Women’s levels of
political interest and support for equality in political participation are more fixed in their
youth, whereas men’s levels evolve through middle age. The evidence also indicates that
reducing the gender gap in political interest would significantly narrow gender differences in
civic activism. Most notably, men appear to be more easily swayed by elite cues that favor or
oppose women’s political participation; women’s support for equal participation is much less
susceptible to reversals in elite support. The consolidation of advances in gender equity thus
depends significantly on contextual factors such as elite discourse.
T he gender gap concept has been used to point out differences betweenmen and women regarding attitudes about and participation in
politics, policy views, and beliefs about the role of women in social
and political life. Early studies identified a “traditional gender gap” in
which women were more conservative than men, had less interest in
politics, and consequently participated less (Almond and Verba 1963).
Beginning in the 1970s, the theory that women were politically
conservative as a fixed, structural characteristic was challenged. New
research argued that women developed new interests and began to vote
more to the left as female labor force participation increased, resulting in
a “modern gender gap” (Manza 1998). This new gender gap has been
attributed to a variety of factors including increasing modernization,
which is particularly evident in postindustrial societies (Inglehart and
Norris 2003).
In regions like Latin America that have lower levels of economic
development, education, female labor force participation, and secularism
than do postindustrial societies, however, traditional gender differences
may still prevail (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Jennings 1998; Macaulay
2006, 104–7; Rodrı́guez 2003). At the same time, structural changes in
developing countries, as well as democratization and advances by women’s
movements, may promote movement toward a modern gender gap. Across
the region, the mobilization of women was instrumental in pressuring for
democratic transitions (Baldez 2002; Jaquette 1991). With varying degrees
of success, women fostered greater equality by pressuring for the
establishment of state women’s agencies, the passage of laws that
criminalized domestic violence and addressed discrimination in the
workplace, and the promotion of women’s political representation through
measures like gender quotas (Baldez 2003; Craske and Molyneux 2002;
Waylen 2000). While a considerable body of research has developed
concerning the influence of the women’s movement in pressuring for
regime transitions, and later in achieving legal changes and political
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representation, the extent to which these demands and reforms have
extended to the mass public is largely unexplored.
To understand how the mass public views gender issues and how these
views are related to elite cues during the formative years of an emerging
democracy, we explore the evolution of gender differences and assess
women’s and men’s responses to elite cues regarding gender in the
Dominican Republic. We examine differences in Dominican women’s
and men’s attitudes and behavior from 1994 to 2004, an important decade
in the country’s democratic development, as well as a period of significant
progress on gender-related policies. Specifically, we analyze the nature and
evolution of gender differences in three important areas for women’s
participation: political interest, civic engagement, and support for women
in politics. Political interest and civic engagement have often been
positively linked to political participation, and differences in activism
frequently translate into inequities in representation (Brady, Verba, and
Schlozman 1995). Gender gaps in interest and engagement have serious
implications for equity in terms of participation inputs and policy outputs.
Understanding gender disparities in these areas tells us if women are less
engaged than men and why, and also illuminates reasons for inequities in
representation.1 Moreover, interest and engagement are areas where
traditional gender gaps have been observed and analyzed in other
countries (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997).
Analyzing attitudes about women’s political participation provides even
clearer insight into gender dynamics. By assessing factors that shape support
for women in politics, we directly examine the causal processes that lead to
feminist political positions and analyze the depth with which Dominicans
embrace such views. We also evaluate whether processes that produce
support for women in politics are distinct among women and men.
Together, these analyses of interest, participation, and feminist attitudes
about politics enable us to understand the extent to which women and
men engage the political realm at different levels, what factors most
influence how these differences are produced in a developing
democracy, and where gains may potentially be made in terms of equity
in both participation and representation.
1. We use four DEMOS surveys carried out from 1994 to 2004, the first set of high-quality surveys of
political and social attitudes and behaviors conducted in the Dominican Republic. We do not analyze
voting because of the difficulties associated with self-reported electoral participation and because the
surveys were conducted at different points in the election cycle. The surveys did not ask about
political participation beyond voting. We focus on gender gaps in three important areas for which
we have ample, reliable data.
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The Dominican Republic is an excellent context in which to examine
these issues as sociopolitical trends of democratization and progress in
gender equity mirrored those of other countries in Latin America. Similar
to other Third Wave democracies, the 1990s were important in the
Dominican Republic’s democratic development. The first six decades of the
twentieth century were marked by instability, a U.S. occupation (1916–24),
and the brutal dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo (1930–61). A key figure of the
Trujillo era, Joaquı́n Balaguer, then governed for 22 of the next 30 years,
combining political stagnation with socioeconomic transformation. Our
analysis begins at the end of Balaguer’s rule, a period of extensive
mobilization around the 1994 election, and extends into the current post-
Balaguer democracy. Existing research suggests that political changes that
accompany democratization are likely to facilitate support for, and the
engagement of, women. Therefore, the Dominican Republic, as other
countries in the region, would be expected to experience changes toward
modern gender gaps over the recent past.
Dominican women attained significant political advances during this
period. In the 1990s, political elites, led by coalitions of female civic leaders
and legislators, encouraged women’s rights and access to elected
office (Gómez Carrasco 2005). Motivated particularly by the Centro
de Investigación para la Acción Femenina, a prominent women’s
nongovernmental organization, political parties incorporated women’s issues
to varying degrees for the first time during the 1990 electoral campaign
(Cordero 1991). During the 1994 campaign, a broader coalition of women
drawn from political parties, NGOs, and community organizations
generated a more extensive plan to provide women with equal opportunities
(Gómez Carrasco 2005). By the second half of the 1990s, national-level
politicians were using gender-inclusive language in their campaign speeches.
Important legal and bureaucratic changes favoring gender equity were
also achieved, if not always fully realized. Funding for the Office for
the Promotion of Women (Dirección General de la Promoción de la
Mujer — DGPM), which had been established in 1982 within the
Ministry of the Presidency, increased during the 1990s. Then in
response to a long-standing demand of feminist groups, the DGPM was
elevated to the cabinet level, becoming the Ministry of Women
(Secretarı́a de Estado de la Mujer) in 1999 (CEDAW 1998).
In 1997, Congress passed two important laws promoting women’s private
and public rights. The first law (Ley contra la Violencia Intrafamiliar)
established protections from domestic violence in accordance with the
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
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Eradication of Violence against Women, which the Dominican
Republic ratified in 1995 (CEDAW 1998; Perez 2005). The second
law established a quota system requiring women to be 25% of the
candidates in city council and Chamber of Deputies elections. In
2000, new laws raised the quota to 33%, established that male and
female candidates should alternate in placement on party lists, and
required parties to nominate a woman for either mayor or vice mayor.2
These measures reflected the influence of similar ones in other
countries in the region (Htun and Jones 2002; Krook 2006). As a result
of these reforms, the Dominican Republic now compares favorably to
other countries regarding women in local-level offices and the
legislature, though not in national executive-level cabinet positions
(Valdés, Muñoz, and Donoso 2005).
A symbolic capstone of progress for women in the Dominican Republic
was attained in 2000, when Milagros Ortiz Bosch was elected as the
country’s first female vice president. Overall during the 1990s and early
2000s, the discourse and actions of partisan elites were more favorable to
women’s participation than in prior periods. Yet progress did not
continue in a linear direction. As we discuss more fully below, political
elite discourse in fact shifted dramatically as the 2004 presidential
campaign approached, becoming more confrontational and less positive
toward women. This reversal allows us to test the susceptibility of mass
attitudes about women in politics to shifts in elite cues, thereby exploring
the extent to which acceptance or rejection of women’s rights and
representation among elites is paralleled among the public. Our goal in
this article, beyond confirming broad expectations about shifts in gender
gaps, is to analyze how mass attitudes evolve and to assess sensitivity to
changes in elite cues. These issues remain relatively understudied in
emerging democracies and have important analytical and policy
implications.
One of our most important findings is that the process of attitudinal change
is highly uneven, a factor sometimes minimized in modernization type
explanations (Adams and Orloff 2005; cf. response by Inglehart and Norris
2005). Prior to 2004, positive cues by elites enhanced support for women
in politics among party followers, but in 2004, overall levels of support for
2. The gender quota led to an increase in women deputies from 11.6% in 1994 to 16.7% in 1998.
Parties placing women at the bottom of lists mitigated its impact. In 2002, the higher quota was
offset by reductions in district magnitudes and a shift from closed lists to open lists. Although the
quotas were enforced, the share of seats held by women deputies declined slightly to 16.1% in 2002
(Jiménez Polanco 2005).
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women declined noticeably and negative cues by party leaders hurt
perceptions of women, though only among male followers. This is
congruent with other research regarding the importance of contextual cues
impacting political attitudes and behavior (Atkeson 2003; Sapiro and
Conover 1997), and suggests that advances in men’s support of gender
issues are less stable than those among women. We discover that education
and age influence women and men differently and in ways not previously
highlighted in the literature. While there are no age differences among
women in their attitudes about women in politics, men’s support for
women’s political involvement increases for men through middle age. This
result does not support a simple image of generational replacement as the
major explanatory factor driving attitudinal change. Our analysis
emphasizes the importance of elite issue leadership and education as
central to increasing support for women in politics.
THE GENDER GAP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
To analyze the evolution of gender gaps in Dominican democracy, we
employ data taken from four national public opinion surveys — the
DEMOS surveys — conducted in 1994, 1997, 2001, and 2004.3 These
landmark surveys asked questions about civic and political engagement,
views about women, and social and political values for which data had not
previously been available. The surveys were funded by the U.S. Agency for
International Development’s Democratic Initiatives Project, administered
by the Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra in Santo
Domingo. To draw a sample representative of all Dominican citizens age
18 or over, a multistage, stratified sampling method was used.4 Interviews
were conducted in respondents’ homes on both weekdays and weekends,
guaranteeing that the samples included people of different backgrounds
and socioeconomic levels, and care was taken to make the survey
instrument readily accessible. These efforts captured samples reflecting the
Dominican population and ensured low nonresponse and refusal rates.5
3. Dates: 19 Jan.–6 Mar. 1994; 17 Jun.–28 Jul. 1997; 22 May–30 Jun. 2001; 20 Jan.–3 Mar. 2004.
4. Comparing men and women was a main goal of the design, making our analysis especially suitable.
See Duarte et al. (1996) for more details concerning sample design. Weighted and unweighted data
yield similar findings, but to assure precision we used weighted data.
5. Refusal rates were less than 20% of eligible respondents. Nonresponse on individual items ranged
from 5% to 15%. Compared to census data, samples reflect the population on sex, age, education, and
region.
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Table 1 compares the means for men and women on three additive
scales6 that measure political interest, civic engagement, and support for
women in politics, allowing us to assess the presence or absence of
gender gaps.7 The interest scale is generated from three items, which
each range from 0 (none) to 2 (a lot) and measure interest in politics,
frequency of political news exposure, and frequency of political
conversations. The engagement scale tallies the number of organizations
to which a respondent belongs.8 Respondents earn one or two
more points on the scale for sometimes or frequently attending
neighborhood meetings.9 Five items measure support for women in
politics: Women should participate more in politics, women candidates
inspire as much confidence as men, women have as much governing
capacity as men, women should participate in politics the same as
men, and “politics is for men.” Agreement with the first four items
earns one point on the scale; disagreement with the final item earns one
point.10
Political interest increased slightly between 1994 and 2004. Interest
among men remained fairly constant, but women’s interest grew by 20%.
Although a traditional gender gap in political interest persists in the
Dominican Republic, the gap narrowed over this time period.
Examining civic engagement, men participated significantly more than
women in all four surveys, although the gap narrows between 1994 and
2004. Overall levels of civic engagement declined by close to 50% over
10 years.11
We find limited evidence of gender gaps in support for women in
politics during the 1990s. But in 2001, a modern gender gap emerges as
6. All scales have Cronbach’s alphas near .7, indicating scale reliability (cf. Banaszak and Plutzer
1993).
7. The scales are ordinal and so we also present scale medians, but we analyze the means since this
enables us to assess if gender gaps are statistically significant. The scales have enough categories to justify
treatment as interval variables, and treating the scales as interval or ordinal does not alter the multivariate
findings.
8. The organizations are community, parent, peasant, professional, sport, women, union, and
Christian base.
9. Incorporating community participation is important because of the significance of women’s
participation in the neighborhood movement. Failure to include it in the scale would underestimate
women’s participation.
10. All but one of these questions were originally designed as dichotomous. The item about women
participating in politics the same as men has three response categories. Also in 2004, 10-point scales
measured “politics is for men” and “women should participate more.” We recoded the scales to
dichotomous options as in the other years. More coding details are available from the authors.
11. Civic engagement was unusually high in 1994, as extensive mobilization preceded the May
elections; the decline in subsequent years reflects growing disenchantment with civil society (see
Hartlyn 1998, 219–57).
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support for women’s participation grows more rapidly among women than
men. On the scale and on each item from which it is constructed, women
are more egalitarian than men in the twenty-first century. For both genders,
egalitarianism increases over the decade. But within this general pattern an
important qualification is necessary because in 2004, support for women in
politics declines slightly, particularly among men. The greater reversal in
support for women in politics among males contributes to the significant
modern gender gap in 2004. Following other research, we believe this
stems from contextual factors that can have important impacts on
attitudes about gender (Atkeson 2003; Sapiro and Conover 1997). In
2004, the country’s first female vice president governed and remained
closely identified with a highly discredited administration, and she
participated in an electoral campaign with more explicit machista
overtones than previous ones. We assess the effects of elite cues in the
multivariate analysis that follows. The changes in attitudes about women
in politics suggest a shift toward egalitarianism, but the step back in
2004, especially by men, signals that these advances are not well
established.
Table 1. Gender gaps in interest, engagement and support for women in
politics, 1994–2004
Variable Name Year Sample
Mean





(range: 0 to 6)
1994 2.44 2.92 1.96 .96** 2
1997 2.50 3.09 2.08 1.01** 2
2001 2.52 2.90 2.14 .76** 2
2004 2.57 2.86 2.31 .55** 2
Civic engagement
(range: 0 to 10)
1994 2.00 2.30 1.71 .59** 2
1997 1.28 1.67 1.00 .67** 1
2001 1.24 1.46 1.02 .44** 1
2004 1.09 1.26 .94 .32** 1
Support for women
in politics
(range 0 to 5)
1994 2.66 2.59 2.73 2.14 3
1997 3.29 3.26 3.32 2.06 4
2001 3.64 3.54 3.74 2.20** 4
2004 3.31 3.09 3.51 2.42** 4
Note: Reported means are weighted to correct for survey sampling effects.
a Positive scores indicate traditional gender gap; negative scores indicate modern gender gap.
Standard errors are available from authors.
*p , .05; ** p , .01 indicate mean for male respondents is significantly different from mean for
females using two-tailed t-tests.
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WOMEN AND POLITICS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Beyond describing the nature and evolution of gender gaps, we also seek to
explain the causal factors that have shaped support for women in politics
and the engagement of women versus men. We employ multivariate
regression to analyze political interest, civic engagement and support for
women’s participation in politics, using the scales we introduced
previously.12 We begin by examining political interest and civic
engagement to determine the factors that encourage people to opt into
involvement and to determine whether the gender gaps in political
interest and civic engagement observed in the bivariate analysis persist
when controls are introduced.
In addition to gender, we consider three sets of independent variables
that we expect to influence political interest and civic engagement:
motivations, integration into public life, and sociodemographic variables.
The first set of variables measures motivations to be interested in politics
or to participate in civic organizations. We hypothesize that economic
downturns or failure to deliver basic services may provoke engagement in
order to evoke change, while contentment with government
performance will lead to less engagement (Finkel and Opp 1991). To
assess the role of dissatisfaction with government in motivating
engagement, we include two independent variables: service delivery
evaluations and economic assessments. We measure service evaluation
with an eight-point scale that combines assessments of seven government
services and views of the economy with an item that asks respondents to
evaluate their family’s economic status on a five-point scale ranging from
very bad to very good.
Second, we hypothesize that integration into public life will produce
more engagement. We use employment status to measure integration —
people who are working will have more opportunity and impetus to be
engaged than will the unemployed. Those who are not working are less
likely to connect with other individuals or groups that promote
participation (McDonough, Shin, and Moisés 1998).13 Interest in the
public realm is also likely to translate into active participation
12. We also analyzed interest and support for women using ordered logit analysis and civic
engagement using tobit analysis. These maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) techniques are more
ideal than ordinary least squares regression (OLS) given the nature of these scales. MLE yielded
results essentially identical to OLS. We present the OLS results because they are more easily
interpreted than the MLE alternatives.
13. In analyses not shown, we tested for but found no differences in formal versus informal sector.
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through civic engagement. Previous research has also demonstrated that
both news exposure (Brehm and Rahn 1997) and overall political
interest (McDonough, Shin, and Alvaro Moisés 1998) promote
participation in neighborhood groups and voluntary associations. So we
expect a general interest in politics, which captures news exposure as
well as self-reported political interest, to encourage greater civic
participation. Therefore, political interest is included as an independent
variable in the civic engagement analysis.14
Sociodemographic variables are the third set of factors associated with
political and civic engagement. We expect that as people become older
(Strate et al. 1989),15 more educated (Brehm and Rahn 1997), and
accumulate more resources (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Brehm
and Rahn 1997), they will be more engaged. We also take account of
the possibility that these factors may operate differently among men than
they do among women, as other research has shown (Howell and Day
2000; Jennings 1998; see Bolzendahl and Myers 2004 for a partial
dissent). We consider interactions between gender and three socio-
demographic factors: education, age, and socioeconomic status. The
effects of marital status16 and place of residence are also tested (Brehm
and Rahn 1997).
POLITICAL INTEREST AMONG WOMEN AND MEN
Table 2 presents the multivariate analysis of political interest. The findings
indicate that even with the inclusion of other independent variables,
gender maintains a statistically significant relationship with political
interest in all four years. This finding is consistent with other research
that has found that although women now tend to vote as often as men,
they still have less interest in politics (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Verba,
Burns, and Schlozman 1997). The difference between women and men
does decline significantly over the period, suggesting that some advances
in eliminating the traditional gender gap are being made.
The analysis considers the mobilizing potential of frustration with
government performance and finds that negative evaluations of
government services are associated with greater political interest in 1994
14. It is possible that civic engagement enhances political interest, thereby creating a reciprocal
relationship. Following existing research, we emphasize the link from interest to participation.
15. With the exception of the very aged, among whom participation tends to decline slightly.
16. Married or unido (living together/common law marriage) score 1. All others score zero.
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Table 2. OLS regression: Political interest in the Dominican Republic, 1994–2004
Independent Variables 1994 1997 2001 2004
Female 2.85** (.10) 2.93** (.10) 2.68** (.08) 2.63** (.09)
Evaluation of services 2.09** (.02) 2.04 (.02) 2.04* (.02) .02 (.02)
Pocketbook evaluation 2.06 (.05) 2.06 (.05) .07 (.04) 2.02 (.05)
Employed .15 (.10) 2.05 (.11) .12 (.08) .05 (.09)
Age: 18–29 yearsa 2.52** (.12) 2.67** (.13) 2.34** (.12) 2.33** (.13)
18–29*Female .45 (.27) .43 (.35) .59** (.21) .44* (.22)
Age: 30–39 yearsa 2.12 (.13) .29 (.24) 2.28* (.11) 2.08 (.11)
30–39*Female 2.19 (.27) 2.28* (.14) .13 (.24) 2.02 (.22)
Age: 50–59 yearsa 2.27 (.15) 2.15 (.17) .09 (.14) .14 (.15)
50–59*Female 2.15 (.32) .05 (.33) 2.03 (.27) 2.82** (.29)
Age: 60þa 2.22 (.18) 2.50** (.18) 2.35* (.13) 2.01 (.14)
60 and up*Female .39 (.33) .06 (.31) 2.14 (.29) 2.67* (.26)
Education .28** (.04) .37** (.03) .33** (.03) .33** (.03)
Education*Female 2.02 (.05) 2.05 (.05) 2.01 (.05) 2.18** (.06)
Socioeconomic status .03** (.01) .03** (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.01)
Casada(o)/unida(o) 2.05 (.09) 2.004 (.08) 2.08 (.09) 2.09 (.08)
Rural .18 (.11) .13 (.12) .06 (.08) 2.11 (.08)
Constant 2.58 (.17) 2.74 (.15) 2.36 (.17) 2.68 (.16)
R-squared .21 .22 .16 .13
Model Significance .00 .00 .00 .00
N 1738 1788 2228 3085
Note: Ordered logit yields the same substantive results. aReference category: 40–49 years.
** p , .01; * p , .05. Significance tests are two-tailed. Standard errors in parentheses.
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and 2001. But there is no effect for service evaluations in 1997 or 2004, and
economic evaluations have no significant impact in any year. There is no
support for the idea that people integrated in the public sphere through
employment will be prompted to take an interest in politics. In terms of
structural factors in 1994 and 1997, socioeconomic status has a positive
effect that translates into a difference of about .75 points on the political
interest scale between the poorest respondents and the most prosperous
ones. But this effect dissipates in 2001 and 2004. Marital status and place
of residence have no significant influence.
We include interactions for both age and education with gender in order
to explore whether these factors have different effects among men and
women.17 Following conventions for interpreting the substantive
meaning of interaction terms, Table 3 displays the calculation of the
marginal effects (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006) of age and
education among men and women, as well as the conditional standard
errors (Friedrich 1982).18 These calculations enable us to determine
how these factors operate among men and women and to assess whether
there are gender differences in their effects on political interest. We
measure age using five groups to allow for the possibility of a nonlinear
effect for age, with respondents in their 40s as the reference group. The
marginal effects of age on political interest presented in Table 3
demonstrate that men under 40 are significantly less interested in politics
than men in their 40s, but that there are no significant differences in
interest among men over 40. We also find no differences in political
interest among women of different ages, except in 1997 when women
under 30 are significantly less interested than are women in their 40s. So
men’s political interest increases until they reach middle age, when it
levels out, while women’s interest tends not to vary with age.
As hypothesized, education has a strong positive influence on political
interest. Table 3 also reveals that the effect of education in promoting
interest is greater among men. The difference is present in all four
surveys, but is most notable in 2004, when the coefficient for men is .18
points higher than for women. This sizable difference in the effect of
education suggests that while education promotes political engagement
17. We found no significant gender differences in the effects of socioeconomic status or any other
independent variables and therefore exclude these interaction terms from the analysis here.
18. All the interaction terms are constructed using centered versions of the component variables.
Centering alleviates potential collinearity and involves transforming the variable by subtracting its
mean from each case. To calculate properly the marginal effects presented in Tables 3 and 6, we
also use these centered variables.
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Table 3. Marginal effects of age and education on political interest
Variable 1994 1997 2001 2004
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Age: 18–29a 2.30 (.20) 2.75** (.16) 2.43* (.20) 2.86** (.15) 2.08 (.15) 2.67** (.16) 2.13 (.17) 2.57** (.17)
Age: 30–39a 2.21 (.20) 2.02 (.17) 2.12 (.22) 2.40** (.15) 2.23 (.15) 2.36* (.17) 2.09 (.18) 2.07 (.13)
Age: 50–59a 2.35 (.23) 2.20 (.21) 2.13 (.27) 2.18 (.20) .08 (.18) .11 (.20) 2.24 (.20) .58* (.22)
Age: 60þ a 2.02 (.28) 2.41 (.22) 2.47 (.27) 2.53** (.20) 2.41 (.22) 2.27 (.16) 2.32 (.19) .35 (.19)
Education .27** (.04) .28** (.05) .34** (.04) .40** (.04) .33** (.04) .34** (.04) .25** (.05) .43** (.04)
Note: Calculations based upon centered variables. Conditional standard errors are in parentheses. ** p , .01; * p , .05.
aReference category: 40–49.
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overall, there may be something about the educational process in the
Dominican Republic that encourages men to take more interest in
politics than women, even as men also typically increase their political
interest from their youth into their 40s, while women’s interest remains
more fixed.
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AMONG WOMEN AND MEN
The analysis of civic engagement presented in Table 4 indicates that the
factors contributing to civic participation in the Dominican Republic are
distinct from those that shape political interest.19 Unlike interest, gender
has a more modest impact on civic engagement, with small effects in the
first three surveys and no significant effect in 2004.20 Also, there are no
gender differences in the effects of the independent variables on
engagement as there are for interest. Interacting gender with education
as well as with other variables not shown in the final analysis here reveals
no significant gender differences in causal processes.
We hypothesized that dissatisfaction with government performance
would motivate greater participation but find only limited support for
this idea. Pocketbook evaluations have a negative relationship with
engagement in 1997, but in 2001 the relationship is positive, and in
1994 and 2004 there is no effect. Additionally, service evaluations
actually have a statistically significant, positive influence on engagement
except in 1997. On the other hand, the analysis supports our
expectations concerning integration into public life. Both the employed
and the politically interested are inclined to be active in civic
organizations. These variables have some of the most consistently
significant and substantively important effects here. Except for 1994, the
employed, on average, participate in one more civic group than do the
unemployed. Those at the top of the political interest scale are in two
more civic groups than those with no political interest.
There are significant effects for age and education. Following previous
research (Strate et al. 1989), the youngest Dominicans are the least
19. We log the civic engagement scale to correct for the heteroskedasticity common in this sort of
dependent variable (Range: 0 to 2.4). The nonlogged variable was examined in analyses not shown.
The substantive results are not notably different, but heteroskedasticity was overwhelming and so we
use the logged version.
20. Coefficient values discussed in this section include a reverse transformation of the natural log
function to make coefficients interpretable in real values, rather than in the natural log format.
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Table 4. OLS regression: Civic engagement in the Dominican Republic, 1994–2004
Independent Variables 1994 1997 2001 2004
Female 2.08* (.04) 2.09** (.04) 2.06* (.03) 2.04 (.03)
Evaluation of services .02** (.01) 2.001 (.01) .01* (.01) .02** (.01)
Pocketbook evaluation 2.02 (.02) 2.03* (.01) .03* (.01) .01 (.02)
Political interest .11** (.01) .12** (.01) .11** (.01) .08** (.01)
Employed .02 (.04) .10** (.04) .10** (.03) .09** (.03)
Age: 18–29 yearsa 2.22** (.04) 2.13** (.04) 2.10* (.04) 2.19** (.04)
Age: 30–39 yearsa 2.04 (.05) 2.001 (.04) 2.06 (.04) 2.09* (.04)
Age: 50–59 yearsa 2.06 (.06) .03 (.05) 2.01 (.04) .01 (.05)
Age: 60þa 2.22** (.06) 2.06 (.05) 2.04 (.05) 2.10* (.05)
Education .04** (.02) .04** (.01) .01 (.01) .03** (.01)
Education*Female .01 (.02) 2.002 (.02) 2.02 (.02) .02 (.02)
Socioeconomic status 2.002 (.003) 2.001 (.002) 2.002 (.003) 2.002 (.001)
Casada(o)/unida(o) .03 (.04) .04 (.03) .03 (.03) .05* (.03)
Rural .20** (.05) .12** (.04) .13** (.04) .21** (.03)
Constant .69 (.07) .41 (.07) .21 (.06) .29 (.06)
R-squared .17 .23 .17 .14
Model Significance .00 .00 .00 .00
N 1730 1788 2224 3059
Note: A logged version of the scale is used as the dependent variable in this analysis to avert problems with heteroskedasticity. Logged version range:
0 to 2.4. Tobit Analysis produces the same substantive results.
aReference category: 40–49 years.
** p , .01; * p , .05. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.
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engaged, and as they reach old age civic engagement declines. Our analysis
also coincides with previous research in the finding that more education
(Brehm and Rahn 1997) produces more participation. Residence in rural
communities also promotes greater levels of civic engagement.
To explore why the gender gap diminishes significantly in the
multivariate analysis of civic engagement but not in the analysis of
political interest, we conducted additional analyses not shown here.
Without political interest as an independent variable in the civic
engagement regressions, the gender gap in engagement increases
considerably. The findings concerning the other independent variables
do not change when political interest is dropped, but gender becomes
significant in all four surveys, with women participating in about one
civic organization less than men. But when controlling for political
interest, the gender gap in engagement practically vanishes.21 Politically
interested women are not less likely to participate in the public realm
than similarly interested men, and so enhancing women’s interest in
politics would serve the dual goal of reducing gender differences in
interest and in civic engagement. As greater gender parity in political
interest is achieved, we are likely to observe increased equality in civic
activism.
EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR WOMEN IN POLITICS
In the final portion of the analysis, we examine the scale measuring
attitudes about women’s political participation, which includes both
general questions about women’s political participation and more
specific questions about the suitability of women as candidates and in
public office. We consider three sets of hypotheses. First, we expect that
views of women’s roles in society more broadly will shape perceptions of
the political involvement of women (Banaszak and Plutzer 1993).
Politics is often viewed as a complicated and competitive domain, which
should be reserved for men. But people who hold more generally
egalitarian views of women will more likely be open to women’s equal
participation in politics. If respondents believe that women should take
active and influential positions in the economy and the family, then they
21. When engagement is included as a predictor of interest, the effect of gender remains the same.
This implies that reducing the gender gap in interest is key to reducing the gap in civic engagement,
while reducing the gap in engagement is unlikely to influence the gap in interest.
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are more likely to support women’s active participation in politics as well.
To assess how views about women in society shape support for women in
politics, we use two variables: support for women working and support for
women’s participation in household decisions. Support for women in the
workplace is measured using a question that asks whether women should
only work if men’s income is not sufficient. Respondents who disagree
with limiting women’s employment in this way score a one on this
variable. Support for women in the household is assessed with a question
that asks respondents who should make household decisions: men,
women, or both.
The second set of hypotheses concerns elite cues. Political leaders are
likely to project an array of signals concerning how society should be
organized and how politics should work. If political leaders take specific,
well-publicized steps to promote women’s participation in politics or use
more egalitarian discourse, these practical and symbolic overtures of
inclusiveness may promote broader support for women in politics either
as ordinary citizens or as candidates and elected officials. Alternatively,
the exclusion of women from important political posts, the
marginalization of women in such posts, or the use of machista rhetoric
may encourage more sexist attitudes among the general public (Gillespie
and Spohn 1987). Elite cues are most likely to shape the attitudes of
people such as activists or party members, who are especially connected
with and attuned to the political realm. For this reason, previous studies
include measures of partisan identification as a means of assessing the
extent to which a respondent’s partisan ties might influence his or her
views about women in politics (Banaszak and Plutzer 1993; Gelb 1989).
To test for elite influence, we incorporate measures of political
connectedness into our analysis. We employ partisan affiliation as an
independent variable to assess how respondents’ ties to politics, and
specifically their affinity for political elites, shape their views of women
in politics. We expect people with stronger partisan ties to be more
influenced by either substantive or symbolic changes in elite positions
on matters pertaining to women’s roles in politics. As discussed in the
introduction, the period prior to 2004 was one in which Dominican
political elites, led by coalitions of female civic leaders and then
legislators, encouraged women’s rights and women’s access to elected
office. Significant legislation to combat domestic violence was approved,
state policy machineries to promote women’s interests were introduced
and strengthened, and gender quotas for local and legislative elections
were passed.
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We anticipate a change in the nature of elite influence about women’s
issues in 2004 relative to previous years, however.22 In the 2000 presidential
election, Hipólito Mejı́a was the presidential candidate of the major
opposition Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). He was known for his
strong, even vulgar, discourse in contrast to the country’s other national-
level male politicians. But during the 2000 campaign, his discourse was
tempered and its impact mitigated by the fact that he enjoyed a
comfortable advantage in the polls and that Milagros Ortiz Bosch was
his running mate. Ortiz Bosch was a prominent politician within the
PRD who had been the only woman elected senator for the 1994–98
period, and she had played an important role in passing legislation
advancing women’s interests.
In contrast, throughout the 2004 campaign, Mejı́a’s aggressive and
machista rhetoric surged, with the leading opposition candidate
occasionally responding in kind. In 2002, the PRD-dominated Congress
approved a constitutional amendment permitting immediate presidential
reelection, even though the party had always opposed reelection. Over
2003 and into early 2004, Mejı́a became engaged in a bitter intraparty
conflict regarding the selection of the party’s nominee for the 2004
election, which was only for the presidency and thus focused on the
personalities of the leading candidates.23 Ortiz Bosch had strongly
opposed Mejı́a’s reelection and sought the party’s nomination herself.
But in the end, she endorsed and campaigned for Mejı́a, a candidate
who was heading an unpopular administration in the midst of a severe
economic crisis; also under Mejı́a, progress on various gender equity
goals stalled despite her position in the administration.24 Ortiz Bosch’s
ties to this unpopular administration and its machista rhetoric only
served to undermine the credibility of the most prominent female
politician in the country. In early 2004, Mejı́a turned from the intraparty
conflict to a campaign against his opponent, Leonel Fernández. This
campaign was distinctly harsher, more sexist, and more confrontational
22. Observations about gendered cues are based on field notes and publications by Rosario Espinal,
who spends summers in the Dominican Republic doing research on civil society and political parties
(see Espinal 2004, 2006), and by Jonathan Hartlyn, who has observed every presidential campaign there
since 1986.
23. Constitutional reform in 1994 cut that president’s term to two years, generating nonconcurrent
elections.
24. An “Index of Fulfilled Commitment” regarding political and socioeconomic gender equity goals
shows modest progress from 1995 to 2000, with some reversal from 2000 to 2003 (Gómez Carrasco
2005).
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than in 2000, as polls indicated Fernández enjoyed a wide advantage over
Mejı́a (Fernández ultimately won by a margin of over 25%).
The 2004 campaign represents a shift from previous campaign
discourse, which is why we argue that cues from party leaders
undermined advances in attitudes toward women in politics made
throughout the 1990s.25 As a result of this context during the 2004
survey, we expect respondents with party ties to be less inclined to
support women’s political participation than people without partisan
affiliations.
Our expectations are in line with other research that has found
contextual cues to have a strong influence on attitudes and behaviors
pertaining to women’s political engagement. Atkeson (2003) finds that
the presence and visibility of women as politicians serve to legitimize
women’s participation in politics more generally, and Sapiro and
Conover (1997) find that particular electoral cues and messages impact
the gender basis of electoral behavior. Therefore, we hypothesize that
partisan affiliation is likely to promote support for women initially but to
hurt perceptions of women in politics by 2004. We separate party
members from partisan sympathizers in the analysis in order to assess the
influence of different attachment levels.
The third group of potentially significant factors in shaping support for
women in politics involves life experiences. We account for
sociodemographic characteristics that may affect views of women’s role
in politics. We include gender as a predictor and expect that men will be
less supportive of women’s participation, particularly as the modern
gender gap emerges (Gillespie and Spohn 1987). We examine life-cycle
effects by exploring differences among age groups (Davis and Robinson
1991; Welch 1975). Education is incorporated, with the expectation that
more education promotes more openness to women’s participation
(Banaszak and Plutzer 1993). Finally, we consider marital status and
income as predictors of feminist attitudes (Baxter and Kane 1995;
Conover and Gray 1983).
Previous empirical research (i.e., Banaszak and Plutzer 1993; Inglehart
and Norris 2003), as well as the theoretical argument that the process of
acquiring feminist values is distinct among men and women (Klein
1984), suggest that it is important to allow for the possibility that these
factors may have differential effects on men and women. For instance,
25. At a major Mejı́a rally, Ortiz Bosch, who has admitted her mistake, evoked a common machista
campaign attack line against Fernández that “a man with pants” is needed to govern (Espinal 2004).
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education may have a stronger effect among women because they may more
readily accept the egalitarian ideas that education presumably promotes
(Baxter and Kane 1995). Therefore, we also consider interaction terms
between gender and our independent variables to determine whether
these variables have different effects among men and women.26
ANALYZING SUPPORT FOR WOMEN IN POLITICS
Table 5 presents the analysis of support for women’s political participation.
In all four surveys, support for women working and for women’s
participation in household decision making significantly increase
support for women in politics. Respondents who thought women should
be able to work if they choose score almost one point higher on the
support for women in politics scale than do those who thought women
should only work if a man’s income was insufficient. Thinking that
women should be involved in household decisions, either as equal
partners or as primary decision makers, is also associated with more
egalitarian views of participation. Supporting joint decision-making
results in nearly a full point increase on the dependent variable over
those who believe that only men should make household decisions.
General attitudes about women in the family and society shape more
specific views about women in politics.
Elite cues also have an important influence on support for women’s
participation. To assess the impact of elite issue leadership, we include
variables for party membership and partisan sympathies; those with no
partisan affiliation are the reference category.27 We interact partisan ties
with gender to assess if the effects of elite cues are different between
women and men. Examining Table 5, we immediately see that
membership in a political party has a significant effect on views about
women’s participation. What is more, the nature of this effect varies from
survey to survey in a pattern reflective of the predictions developed earlier
based on the changing nature of elite cues on the issue of women’s roles.
The first row of Table 6 parses out the marginal effects of party
membership among women and men. As expected in 1994, party
26. We considered analyzing men and women separately, but gender differences in the causal process
were limited to a few variables and did not justify separate analyses (cf. Bolzendahl and Myers 2004).
27. The question asked: “Do you belong to or sympathize with a political party?” Only the 2004 survey
distinguished among different parties, where we found no party differences in views about women.
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Table 5. OLS regression: Support for women in politics in Dominican Republic, 1994–2004
Independent Variables 1994 1997 2001 2004
Support women working .90** (.07) .96** (.09) .91** (.08) .63** (.08)
Household decisions by womena .75** (.18) .87** (.13) .45** (.12) .17 (.14)
Household decisions by botha .99** (.08) .94** (.07) .61** (.07) .81** (.07)
Party identification: Memberb .32** (.08) .22* (.11) .14 (.09) 2.15 (.08)
Member*Female .07 (.19) .14 (.17) 2.31 (.16) .20 (.17)
Party identification: Sympathizerb .06 (.07) .03 (.07) .02 (.07) 2.06 (.07)
Sympathizer*Female 2.16 (.15) 2.02 (.15) 2.04 (.14) .35 (.13)
Female .04 (.07) .02 (.07) .11 (.06) .20** (.06)
Age: 18–29 yearsc 2.30** (.09) 2.20* (.08) 2.15* (.08) 2.06 (.09)
18–29*Female .10 (.16) .47** (.17) .26 (.17) .17 (.16)
Age: 30–39 yearsc 2.20* (.09) 2.12 (.08) 2.12 (.09) 2.16 (.09)
30–39*Female 2.10 (.19) .32 (.18) .15 (.17) .08 (.18)
Age: 50–59 yearsc 2.15 (.11) 2.02 (.13) .05 (.11) .01 (.10)
50–59*Female 2.35 (.20) 2.08 (.24) 2.30 (.20) 2.24 (.21)
Age: 60þ 2.06 (.12) .05 (.12) .04 (.10) .05 (.11)
60þ*Female 2.24 (.21) .31 (.25) 2.34 (.19) 2.30 (.22)
Education .21** (.03) .11** (.03) .12** (.02) .15** (.02)
Education*Female .13** (.04) .03 (.04) .05 (.04) .03 (.04)
Socioeconomic status .02** (.01) .01 (.01) .004 (.006) .01 (.01)
Casada(o)/unida(o) 2.21** (.07) .03 (.06) 2.08 (.07) .03 (.06)
Constant 1.55 (.09) 2.02 (.10) 2.67 (.11) 2.29 (.10)
R-squared .34 .26 .19 .20
Model Significance .00 .00 .00 .00
N 2095 2365 2912 4024
aReference category: “Men Decide.”
bReference category: No partisan sympathies.
cReference category: 40–49.
** p , .01; * p , .05. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance tests are two-tailed.
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membership produces greater support for women’s political involvement
among both female and male respondents. Female party members
scored .35 points higher on the women in politics scale than did women
who were not affiliated with a political party, and male party members
scored .29 points higher on the scale than did nonaffiliates. In 1997, the
effect of party membership is diminished and marginally significant, but
is positive as expected. Again in 2001, we see a positive relationship
between party membership and support for women in politics, but here
the effect is only significant among men.
Three years later, though, elite cues no longer promote women in
politics, and we observe that partisan ties now undermine men’s support
for women’s participation. In 2004, both party membership and partisan
sympathies actually reduce men’s support for women in politics, a result
that reflects the expectations about the pattern of elite influence from
2000 to 2004 under the Mejı́a administration. Machista rhetoric and
elites’ deemphasizing of women’s contributions undermined men’s
support for women in politics. It is also interesting to note that although
men continue to be influenced by elites throughout the decade, female
party members in both 2001 and 2004 are not influenced by elite cues.
This finding may be the result of women’s greater likelihood of forming
their own views about women in politics, rather than listening to elites,
especially when elites are undermining their rights. Or perhaps broader
gender-related socioeconomic and cultural dynamics have taken root
more extensively across women than across men. In both surveys, women
are significantly more likely than men to favor women’s political
participation.28
The final variables in Table 5 are sociodemographic: gender, age,
education, socioeconomic status, and marital status. In 1994 and 1997,
female respondents are no more likely to support women’s political
involvement than are their male counterparts. However, in the following
years, a modern gender gap emerges and persists in the multivariate
analysis; the gap is marginally significant in 2001 and clearly significant
in 2004. The last five rows of Table 6 present the marginal effects of age
and education among men and women. Only in 1994 do we find
significant age effects among women. Women in their 20s and 50s are
significantly less supportive of women’s political participation than
women in their 40s, while women over 60 are significantly more
supportive. But age has no significant effects among female respondents
28. In 2001, the effect of being female is marginally significant at the .10 level.
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Table 6. Marginal effects of party ties, age, and education on supporting women in politics
Variable 1994 1997 2001 2004
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Party member .35** (.12) .29* (.14) .30 (.15) .16 (.13) .001 (.11) .31* (.13) 2.06 (.12) 2.26* (.12)
Age: 18–29a 2.25* (.10) 2.36** (.11) .06 (.13) 2.41** (.11) 2.04 (.10) 2.30* (.13) .01 (.11) 2.15 (.13)
Age: 30–39a 2.25 (.13) 2.15 (.14) .05 (.14) 2.26* (.10) 2.06 (.11) 2.21 (.14) 2.12 (.12) 2.20 (.13)
Age: 50–59a 2.33* (.15) .03 (.15) 2.07 (.18) .02 (.17) 2.08 (.14) .22 (.16) 2.11 (.13) .14 (.16)
Age: 60þa .27* (.13) .06 (.14) .13 (.14) 2.08 (.16) 2.11 (.14) .23 (.13) 2.09 (.16) .21 (.14)
Education .27** (.03) .14** (.03) .13** (.03) .10** (.04) .14** (.03) .09** (.03) .16** (.03) .13** (.03)
Note: Conditional standard errors in parentheses.
aReference group: 40–49.
** p , .01; * p , .05. Calculations use centered variables.
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in any other year. Among men, the effects of age are much more consistent.
In every year but 2004, men under 30 are much less supportive of women
in politics than are middle-age men. So while female respondents tend to
maintain the same level of support for women in politics as they age, men’s
attitudes become increasingly positive until they reach their 40s, when
their views stabilize.29
Education has a significant and substantial positive influence on support
for women in politics. As we can see in Table 6, the effect is significant for
both genders, but is particularly strong for female respondents. In every
survey, women score at least .03 points higher than men on the attitudes-
toward-women scale for each additional level of educational attainment.
In 1994 when the effect is especially strong, women with at least some
college education score 3.4 on the scale, while women with no
education score only 2.0; uneducated men score 2.4, and even highly
educated men score only 3.0. This finding suggests that education is an
excellent way to raise support for women’s political participation within
the entire population, but particularly among women.
We only find significant effects for socioeconomic and marital status in
1994, where socioeconomic status has a positive relationship with
egalitarian views of political participation, and where being in a marital
situation has a negative relationship. In the subsequent surveys, these
effects are no longer significant when controlling for other factors.30
Education and socioeconomic status are correlated; if education is
removed from the model, socioeconomic status has a positive and
significant effect in all four years.
The analysis of support for women’s participation in politics points to
several important factors. Particularly influential are general attitudes
about women’s roles, with more egalitarianism leading to more support
for women’s political participation. Elite cues have a significant impact
on people closely connected to the political system through party
membership, and men in particular are vulnerable to changes in elite
cues. So the views that political elites promote concerning women’s
participation in politics have a significant influence on citizens’ support
for gender egalitarianism in politics. Finally, education, especially
among women, and age among men substantially increase support for
women’s political involvement.
29. Although we do not show it here, we conducted cohort analysis to distinguish life-cycle, period,
and generational effects. This analysis supports our interpretation concerning life-cycle effects.
30. Interactions between gender and socioeconomic and marital status were not significant.
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SHAPING GENDER DYNAMICS IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
Our analysis indicates that in the Dominican Republic between 1994 and
2004, traditional gender gaps shrank but remained in place in the areas of
civic engagement and political interest. In multivariate analysis, gender
differences in engagement narrowed, but the traditional gap in interest
remained. In light of persistent gender gaps in political interest in other
countries, this finding is not surprising (though still disturbing). Our
multivariate analysis of civic engagement, though, underscores an issue
that has largely not been emphasized in previous research. Ongoing
gender differences in civic engagement, which are present in the
Dominican Republic as well as in many other countries, may be
attributed to lower levels of political interest among women. It would be
valuable to pursue research in other new democracies in order to discern
if political interest advances among women would likewise promote
parity in engagement within other contexts. At the same time that
traditional gender gaps diminished but persisted in interest and
engagement, we find that a modern gender gap emerged with regard to
support for women in politics. This progress from traditional to modern
gender gaps during a transformative period in an emerging democracy is
in line with expectations generated by previous research. Progress toward
a modern gender gap is more advanced in Dominicans’ attitudes than in
their actions.
From a comparative and policy perspective, one of the most interesting
findings from the multivariate analyses concerns the differences in the
effects of age and education among women and men. Consistently in all
four surveys, men develop greater political interest as they age into their
40s, but women largely do not. We find similar results with regard to
support for women in politics; controlling for other factors, men’s
attitudes become more positive as they age, whereas women’s views are
more similar across age groups. This finding contradicts some previous
research, which has found that younger people hold more feminist views
(Plutzer 1991; Welch 1975) and that generational replacement will
reduce or eliminate traditional gender gaps (Inglehart and Norris 2003).
With consistent levels of political interest and feminist attitudes among
women of all ages in the Dominican Republic, it is unlikely that
generational replacement alone will lead to increases in interest or
feminism among women over time. This divergence raises the possibility
that generational replacement producing greater gender equity is not an
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inevitable process, but rather hinges on other factors that produce the
generational difference among women that has been observed in some
countries, but not here.
We also observed education’s powerful effect on women’s attitudes about
their role in politics, far stronger than education’s influence on men. But in
the case of political interest, more education actually widens the traditional
gender gap, as the effect of education in boosting interest is stronger among
men. Education in the Dominican Republic appears to encourage
feminist attitudes among women, without prompting them in an
equivalent manner to become more engaged in politics.
Finally and perhaps most intriguingly, our analysis demonstrates that
there are important gender differences in the effects of elite cues on
support for women in politics. Specifically, we find that feminist
attitudes among men align with shifts in elite behavior and discourse,
while women’s views are not as influenced by contextual factors. Visible
elite support for women’s political involvement in the 1990s promoted
similar support among Dominicans who were most closely tied to these
leaders — party members. But during the early 2000s, some political
leaders stepped back from active promotion of women’s participation in
politics and embraced machista rhetoric, discouraging respect for
women’s political involvement. This served to undermine support for
women in politics, particularly among male party members who may
have been less firmly committed to the ideal of women’s involvement
and more susceptible to negative elite influence. So while positive elite
cues prompted greater support for women in politics among both
women and men, negative elite signals caused men to question the
benefits of women’s political participation. Together with previous
research (Atkeson 2003; Sapiro and Conover 1997), this finding
emphasizes the importance of elite influence in promoting or
undermining gender egalitarianism and indicates that gender inequities
are not entirely attributable to socialization processes. So even as
women’s movements and other civic groups continue to press for greater
gender equity and a more active role for women in politics, these
findings suggest how crucial it is that the rhetoric and actions of political
leaders constantly enhance respect for, and the practice of, women’s
political rights.
Our findings, together with studies of women’s rights in other emerging
democracies (LaFont 2001; Rodriguez 2003), make clear that progress on
women’s issues is not unidirectional. It cannot be taken for granted as the
ineluctable consequence of broader socio-economic processes or of
60 JANA MORGAN ET AL.
democratization, but is susceptible to elite influence and therefore requires
continued activism and political leadership.
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